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Abstract 
The world map is being designed. The reason behind this turns around the new movement that is centred on the Caspian Sea and 
Middle East. We can might different subjective analysis about these three broad categories. It is a common assumption that the 
energy transfer will change the national borders in the Middle East and influence Turkey. The main variable that will influence the 
future of Turkey is about the decision on the energy transfer pipelines that will transfer the energy between the Asian and the 
European countries. The direction of the pipelines from the Middle Asia will be the key for the geopolitical importance of Turkey. 
Besides, the road that the African gas will follow is closely related with Turkey. Turkey posses one of the strategic areas of the world 
in terms of its geographical location. However, geopolitics location and geographic location are different from each other that are 
generally confused. It is important to work for country’s relative location’s being strong as a country. 
In fact while assessing Turkey's diplomatic and geopolitical interests, one should consider the importance of the Afro-Eurasia 
centered energy transfer and the fact that the results cannot be taken only through diplomatic means. It is important to read the map 
through considering culture and politics rather than sole diplomatic lenses. Besides, while defining the energy politics of the country, 
it is important to consider the fact that petroleum and gas can be consumed in the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Geopolitics Calculus 
The world map is being designed. The reason behind this turns around the new movement that is centered on the 
Caspian Sea and Middle East. We might state this reconfiguration process with reference to three main categories: 
1-The demand for energy which is brought by increasing global population 
2-The Security concerns on the Middle East and Middle Asian Countries which have increased in post 9/11 period. 
3-The asymmetric war conducted by the USA and the NATO against the radical Islamist movement. 
We can might different subjective analysis about these three broad categories. It is a common assumption that the 
energy transfer will change the national borders in the Middle East and influence Turkey. The main variable that will 
influence the future of Turkey is about the decision on the energy transfer pipelines that will transfer the energy 
between the Asian and the European countries. The direction of the pipelines from the Middle Asia will be the key for 
the geopolitical importance of Turkey. Besides, the road that the African gas will follow is closely related with Turkey. 
The concept of relative location in Geography Science is used not only in order to explain that place’s physical 
situation in the world but also its situation. A place’s geographical position can be interpreted differently in accordance 
with the changes depending upon time and place. The best example of relative location’s change depending upon time 
is World energy circulation and the change it cause in geopolitical situations of the countries. Countries develop new 
plans and strategies depending upon each other and time. However, an unlooked-for, different event causes these 
estimates to be made back to the drawing board. Global energy circulation network is composed of many other small 
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sub-networks that are different or alike, competitor or alternative. The relations of small networks and the company they 
make constitute the world energy circulation network. The route that the global energy chose for circulation brings 
about radical changes in the region’s natural and human environmental relations. Thus, many scientists do 
brainstorming in order to foresee these changes before decades and develop strategies. It is important for the relative 
location to raise value in global scale.  
Being directly proportional with the geographical areas in which energy is produced and marketed, geographical 
situation raises in value. The location of the countries in the world possessing the energy is important as absolute 
location. However, the step of energy marketing is a really different area in which many estimates, international 
relations take place. Every pounces to be taken in this area is significant for your country, other countries and finally for 
the world. Thus, other countries follow your country very closely. Each pounce’s meeting with another one as a 
reaction is natural. Like Russia’s introducing south flow project as a response Turkey’s Nabucco pounce. This 
competition in which estimates of those who make more foreseeing, comprehensive estimates is advantageous but can 
never be the winner makes its mark on 21th century’s last quarter with its density. Apparently, the first half of the 21st 
century will continue in a world order in which energy is dominating with the understanding of taking share and getting 
situation advantage.  
In this order, many regions and countries make geopolitical estimates. Many countries of the Middle East, the USA 
and Russia are the first and significant countries. Yet, many other countries willingly or unwillingly take part in these 
estimates or will take part in the future. Turkey, China, Iran, Pakistan, Greece, Bulgaria, Caucasians, Balkans, East 
Europe, being Algeria the first North Africa countries will look over their situations depending upon the flow of energy. 
Turkey’s geographic and relative location in this step is depending both on its preferences as a country and on the 
developments in the other countries.  Especially the dimensions of the competition between Russia and the USA will 
directly affect Turkey’s geopolitics. Thus, the politics that Turkey should apply and possible geopolitics reflections in 
response to probable developments and predictions in the world concerning energy will be mentioned.  
1.2. Europe And Turkey: Relative Locations 
According to Carl Dahlman [1], Turkey’s accession to the European Union, presents a cogent rebuttal to the 
argument that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim nation, whose values are incompatible with those of 
“Christian Europe,” and whose inclusion would require changing the “idea” of Europe, possibly spelling its end. 
Professor Dahlman posits that geographical Europe is hardly a culturally homogeneous society and civilization, divided 
as it is by profound linguistic, religious, and national cultures and traditions. He points out that Turkey’s European 
orientation goes back to the Ottoman period, and has been the centerpiece of Turkish nationalism since Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk set the course for a modernized, secular republic over 70 years ago. The article traces Ankara’s tortuous path 
towards accession, which has been facilitated by the recent recommendation of the European Commission in October 
2004 that the European Council approve the start of accession negotiations. 
That argument echoes Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory, which draws a fault line between the 
Europe of Western Christianity, and the Orthodox Christianity and Islamic civilizations to its east [2]. 
According to the European Commission, extraction costs in the Union are high and the scarce domestic sources that 
the EU has are running out. Domestic oil resources, for example, are moving towards exhaustion; renewables, which 
could become a significant domestic resource of energy in the EU, will need significant investments and substantial 
policy efforts in order to do so. Therefore the EU as a whole cannot expect domestic energy production to contribute to 
fulfilling its energy needs under the current circumstances [3, 12].  
This situation makes the EU vulnerable, particularly due to its economic dependence on certain types of energy,  
such as oil and gas, and on particular exporting countries. Currently, the Union imports 40 percent of its external natural 
gas from Russia and 45 percent of its imported oil from the OPEC Middle East countries.16 The European Commission 
states that the security of supply should not be realized maximizing energy self sufficiency or reducing EU dependence.  
The policy towards security of supply should rather aim at minimizing the risks associated with EU energy dependence 
“by balancing between and diversifying various sources of supply (by product and by geographical region).”   
In terms of diversifying its energy sources, the Union’s options are rather limited due to the lack of feasible 
alternative sources. The policy of diversifying energy imports can also bring only limited results.  The world’s 
remaining oil reserves will be increasingly concentrated in the Middle East;18 major natural gas reserves are located in 
only a few regions from which the production and transport costs are economically viable for the Union: Russia, the 
Caspian region, the Near East and Nigeria.  Since Turkey borders most of these regions on one side and the EU on the 
other, it could provide for greater energy security by becoming another vital import route into the Union.  
According to Roberts, 10 producers, with 35.5 percent of global gas reserves, are or might potentially be interested in 
using Turkey as a transit country to the EU. Thus the country’s role in the Union’s gas import market will remain great. 
Although Turkey plays a role in the global oil market as well,  its role as a transit country for the EU market is 
important rather than vital (figure 1). According to these conclusions, Turkey is of major geopolitical importance to the 
EU It can be vital in the relations between the EU and many of its energy suppliers and could constitute an option 
towards greater diversification of export routes to the Union and therefore more energy security [4]. 
Ilhan Oguz Akdemir / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 19 (2011) 71–80 73
Equally important as water is Turkey’s central location in the transport of energy resources. To the West, Turkey has 
deep water ports on the Mediterranean and common borders with Greece and Bulgaria, and through them, the European 
Union. The European Union is the world’s second largest and most integrated consumer of energy resources, behind 
only the United States. For years, Europe has imported a large portion, more than 25%, of its natural gas resources from 
Russia, primarily from pipelines going through countries of the former Soviet Union.  
 
 
Figure. 1. Existing and Planned natural Gas Pipelines to The Europe and West Asia (2010) 
However, the EU has more recently become very sensitive to its dependence on Russian resources. In early January, 
Russia turned off one of its European pipelines over a commercial dispute with neighbouring Ukraine. While Russia 
claimed that the cut-off was due to a supply disagreement, it is clear that disapproval of Ukraine’s new, pro-Western 
government also played a role. Millions of citizens across Europe were left without gas due to the dispute, which has 
demonstrated to Europe that Russia is willing to use its energy pipelines for political purposes. As Europe attempts to 
diversify its energy supply, the only gas pipeline alternatives are from Central Asia and the Middle East, routes that 
both must ultimately pass through Turkey. Just like Russia, Turkey’s neighbors: Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Syria also 
have significant energy resources. Currently, many of these countries have been unable to effectively penetrate the 
European market, due to the lack of convenient pipeline routes. Turkey has a significant role to play in the transport of 
these resources to European consumers [5]. 
Turkey plays a singular role as an energy transit-way because it controls both a sea route, the Narrows between 
Europe and Asia and overland routes to the Mediterranean.  While much of Central Asia’s energy resources will 
continue to move through Russia’s pipelines to the Black Sea and the Turkish outlet, some will soon flow through lines 
westward from the Caspian and across Turkey to terminals on its Mediterranean shores.  Healthy competition among 
the interested powers for Central Asia’s oil and gas concessions and pipeline infrastructure is to be welcomed. But 
competition that deteriorates into heavy-handed military and political pressures to gain monopolistic positions would 
spell disaster. Such negative competition can lead only to conflict, as outside powers set one Central Asian state against 
another, or abet separatist uprisings and domestic coups. Such fragmentation from the combination of external pressures 
and internal regional divisions would convert Central Asia into the kind of Shatterbelt that has characterized the Middle 
East since the end of World War I. The alternative is for the world’s major powers to collaborate in developing Central 
Asia as a Gateway region [6].  
This means not only joint development of its energy resources, but forging market-sharing agreements.  The 
European Union is best positioned to lead such a collaborative effort, and Turkey’s membership in the Union would 
enhance its capacity to do so. Ankara can reach out to that part of the Muslim world once known as Turkestan the land 
of the Turks from the Caspian Sea to China’s western frontier lands. Turkey’s traditional influence there is based on 
linguistic, religious, and racial ties. It would be further enhanced by its providing an example of the benefits that accrue 
to a modern, secular Muslim republic, when it integrates politically and economically with a major power center such as 
the EU. In addition, Turkey could help stabilize the Middle East by directing unused fresh waters from rivers such as 
the Seyhan and Ceyhan that now discharge into the Mediterranean, through a “Peace Pipeline” to the Levant and the 
Arabian Peninsula, which Turkish leaders first proposed two decades ago  [7]. 
1.3. Turkey And Russia's Oil-Gas Transportation System  
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Russia's existing national oil trunk pipeline network is a unique technological system.  It comprises 46,800 km of 
trunk pipelines, 395 oil pumping stations, 868 storage facilities with total carrying capacity amounting to 12.7 million 
cubic meters.  The average length of transcontinental routes is 3,500-4,000 km.  The average pipeline diameter of 860 
mm, almost twice as large as the international average, results in higher maintenance costs per kilometer.  According to 
long-range development plans (for the period up to 2010), the length of new oil pipelines in Russia may reach 9,000 
km.  At the same time, 10,000 km -- over 20 percent of the total existing network -- may require refurbishing to one 
degree or another [8] [13]. 
However, European consumers are not planning to sign additional contracts in the nearest future.  Moreover, it is 
becoming more and more evident that in the long run other markets will attract Gazprom's attention.  Shipments to the 
Balkan countries as well as to Greece and Turkey are expected to grow from about 22 BCM in 1998 to an estimate 58 
BCM by 2010. (For reference, Russia's total proven reserves currently amount to 32.3 trillion cubic meters [8]. 
During the last few years Russia experienced difficulties exporting gas during the winter season.  Recent 
irregularities in gas supply to Turkey again led Gazprom blame Ukraine for lack of reliability in its transit 
responsibilities and continuous unauthorized siphoning of gas by the Ukrainian consumers.  Almost 90% of Russia's gas 
exports now transit Ukraine. 
In December 1997 in accordance with an accord between Russia and Turkey, Gazprom and Botas signed an 
agreement for Russian gas supplies.  The agreement projects supply of up to 30 BCM annually by 2010.  Gas is to be 
supplied by two routes:  Via extending of the existing gas pipeline network in Ukraine, Rumania and Bulgaria; and via 
the new "Blue Stream" Black Sea undersea crossing. 
The "Blue Stream" Project, is envisioned as the conduit for 16 BCM of gas supply annually to Turkey by 2010.  It 
will provide direct access to the Turkish market, avoiding transit via third countries. In the long run there may appear 
opportunities for extension to access Middle Eastern countries. The 600 mm pipe, with wall thickness of 35 mm and 
working pressure of 22-25 Mpa, will be laid at a depth of 2,000 meters and pump gas without intermediate compressor 
stations. Poland's Petergas drew the feasibility study together with design and engineering companies from Russia and 
elsewhere in Europe.  The construction of the subsea gas pipeline and Beregovaya compressor station in Russia will be 
accomplished in cooperation with Italy's ENI.  Construction is slated to take place during 2000-2005.  Gazprom is 
actively pursuing this and other major projects, having already successfully lobbied the Russian Parliament for tax 
breaks for Blue Stream (figure 1).  
Diversification of the Northern European project envisages an additional gas supply route to Northern Germany via 
Finland and further through the Baltic Sea reaching Greifswald, Germany.  For this purpose, Nord Transgas company, 
set up by Gazprom and Finnish company Neste Oy, has completed a feasibility study.  The project proposes to supply 
an estimated 45 BCM of gas to the Nordic and European markets by the year 2005 [8] [13]. 
1.4. The Russia-Turkey Pipeline Strategy Game and New Geopolitical Energy Calculus 
In a sense, the Eurasian land area today resembles a geopolitical game of three-dimensional chess between Russia, 
the European Union member countries, and Washington. The stakes of the game are a matter of life and death for 
Russia as a functioning nation, something clearly Medvedev and Putin well realize at this point.  
After the 2004 Ukraine Orange Revolution, Moscow’s western pipeline strategy until now has been to bypass both 
Ukraine and Poland through construction of an underwater gas pipeline, Nord Stream, running from Russia directly to 
Germany. Poland’s Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski is a Washington trained neo-conservative . As the previous 
Defense Minister, he played a central role in Poland’s missile defense agreement with Washington. Sikorski’s Poland 
today is bound closely to NATO, including agreeing to Washington’s militarily provocative missile deployment 
policies, and he is trying at every turn, so far unsuccessfully, to block construction of Nord Stream.  
In a second major front in what could be called the Russia-USA pipeline wars, the US has initiated competing 
proposals to build gas pipelines to serve the countries of southern and southeastern Europe. Here Washington is openly 
backing what is called the Nabucco Turkish pipeline project. Moscow is promoting what it calls its South Stream 
project, the southern Eurasian sister to the Nord Stream in the north of Europe.  
On December 12, 2009 the government of Bulgaria, a former Warsaw Pact member now in NATO and the EU, 
announced that it would participate in Moscow’s South Stream project despite considerable pressure from Washington 
[8]. 
South Stream’s offshore section is to run under the Black Sea from the Russian coast to the Bulgarian coast, a length 
of around 550 miles at a maximum depth over two kilometers (figure 2) and have a full capacity of 63 billion cubic 
meters, even larger than Nord Stream.  
From Bulgaria, South Stream will split into two arms, the northern section stretching to Romania, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Austria and the southern arm going through Bulgaria to southern Italy. The new pipeline is 
expected to become operational in 2013 [8] [14]. 
An indication of the pressure that Washington has put on Bulgaria over its participation in Russia’s South Stream is 
that Bulgaria also signed up to take part in the Nabucco project in December 2009. Commenting on the dual signings, 
Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Boyko Borisov told the press, “Nabucco is a priority of the European Union while the 
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Russian South Stream is moving forward very quickly and many European countries are joining it almost daily.” 
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - _edn9#_edn9 
The central issue for the two competing pipeline projects. South Stream and Nabucco (figure 1and 2), is not who will 
buy their gas. As noted, natural gas demand across Europe is expected to rise dramatically in coming years. Rather it’s 
the question of where the gas will come from to fill the pipeline. Here Moscow now clearly holds the trump cards.  
In addition to gas directly from Russia’s gas fields, a major component of South Stream gas is to come from 
Turkmenistan and from Azerbaijan and possibly at some point from Iran. In December 2009 Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev went to Turkmenistan to sign major agreements on energy cooperation.  
Until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkmenistan was a republic of the Soviet Union, the Turkmen 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Turkmen SSR. It is bordered by Afghanistan to the southeast, Iran to the south and 
southwest, Uzbekistan to the east and northeast, Kazakhstan to the north and northwest and the Caspian Sea to the west. 
Russia’s Gazprom until now has been the dominant economic partner of the country, which has newly confirmed huge 
gas reserves. Turkmen gas has been vital for the supply chain of Gazprom and dates back to the era when Turkmenistan 
was an integral part of the Soviet Union and the Soviet economic infrastructure.  
When ’President for Life,’ Saparmurat Niyazov, known as ‘Türkmenbaúı’ or  ‘leader of the Turkmens,’ died 
unexpectedly in December 2006, Washington began entertaining hopes of weaning the new President, Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedow, away from Russia and into the US orbit. To date they have met with little success.  
The Medvedev-Berdimuhamedow December agreements included new agreements for Turkmen long-term gas 
supplies to Gazprom which will fill the South Stream pipeline either directly or by replacing Russian gas to the same -- 
meaning Nabucco is left out in the cold there.  
The active pipeline diplomacy of Russia and Gazprom in recent months has dealt a devastating blow to 
Washington’s favored alternative, Nabucco, which is planned to run from the Caspian region and Middle East via 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary with Austria and further on to Central and Western European gas markets, some 
3,300 km, starting at the Georgian-Turkish and/or Iranian-Turkish border. End station would be Baumgarten in Austria. 
The project is parallel to the existing US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil pipeline and could transport 20 billion cubic 
meters of gas a year. Two-thirds of the pipeline would pass through Turkish territory.  
Today the future of Nabucco is in grave doubt. The problem is that Russia’s Gazprom has all but locked up long-
term gas contracts with all the potential suppliers of gas for Nabucco, leaving Nabucco high and dry. Thus, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Iraq are being touted as potential suppliers to Nabucco.   
Until now the main gas supply for Nabucco should be Azerbaijan, the source of large oil reserves captured by a BP-
led Anglo-American consortium bringing Baku oil from the Caspian Sea to the west, independent of Russia. That Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was a major reason Washington backed the 2004 Georgian ‘Rose Revolution’ that put 
dictator Mikhail Saakashvili into power. 
In July 2009 Russia’s Medvedev and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller went to Baku and signed a long-term contract to 
buy all the gas from the Azeri Shah Deniz-2 offshore field, the same field Nabucco hopes to tap for its pipeline. 
Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev seems to be playing a cat-and-mouse game with both Russia and EU-Washington, to play 
one off against the other for the highest price. Gazprom agreed to pay an unusually high price of $350 per thousand 
cubic meters for their Shah Deniz gas, a clear political not economic decision by Moscow that owns controlling interest 
in Gazprom.  
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - _edn12#_edn12In early January 2010, the Azeri government also announced 
sale of a portion of its gas to neighboring Iran, another blow to Nabucco supply. 
Currently, even a minimal agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan for delivery of Azeri gas to Nabucco is in 
serious doubt. Despite the highly publicized Turkish government decision in 2009 to finally join Nabucco, the vital 
talks between Turkey and the Azeri government remain stalemated. Despite repeated interventions from US Special 
Envoy on Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar to force a final deal, talks remain deadlocked as of this writing. Adding 
to the woes of Washington’s Nabucco dreams, one of the key partners of the Nabucco, Austria’s OMV, told the Dow 
Jones wire service at the end of January that the Nabucco pipeline would not be built if demand is too low.  
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - _edn14#_edn14 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, though both have significant natural gas reserves, are even more politically and 
geographically unlikely as sources of gas for essentially an anti-Russian project. Their distance would mean 
skyrocketing costs, pricing it far above gas from Gazprom’s South Stream.  
This is no passing fad. Press in both countries speak openly of a Russo-Turkish “strategic partnership.“ 
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - _edn17#_edn17Today Turkey is Russia’s largest market for export of Russian oil 
and gas combined. As well the two countries are discussing plans for Russia to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant 
to meet Turkey’s electricity demand. Bilateral Turkish-Russian trade last year reached $38 billion making Russia 
Turkey’s largest trade partner. The figure is expected to grow some 300% over the next five years, creating a solid and 
expanding pro-Russia trade lobby in Turkey. The two countries are in detailed negotiation over some $30 billion in new 
trade agreements, including Turkey’s nuclear power plant, as well as the South Stream, Blue Stream Turkish-Russian 
gas pipelines and a Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline from Russia to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast (figure 1and 2) 
[15].http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - _edn18#_edn18 
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Indicating how many land mines could explode in the face of Nabucco’s backers, especially in Washington, the 
Turkish parliament on March 4, 2010 approved a bill on the construction of the Nabucco pipeline. But the same day the 
US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee passed a non-binding resolution calling the World War I-era 
killing of Armenians genocide.The vote led to the immediate recall of Turkey’s Ambassador to Washington as a protest, 
and will possibly lead to even closer cooperation between Moscow and Ankara on matters of mutual interest, including 
South Stream. 
The European Union has just approved a $3 billion general economic stimulus that includes $273 million for 
Nabucco. At an estimated final cost of $11 billion, that is hardly convincing support for Nabucco [16] [18]. Moreover, 
the money is being frozen until a final go-ahead for Nabucco is clear, indicating that the countries of the EU are hardly 
as eager as Washington to back the risky Nabucco counter to Moscow’s South Stream. The EU has said if there is no 
firm agreement between Nabucco backers and Turkmenistan for gas supply within six months, the money will be used 
for other projects. http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - _edn19#_edn19 
 
Figure. 2. Project Routes of Nabucco, South Stream and North Streamhttp://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - 
_edn13#_edn13 (Source:Sikri 2008:12) 
The combination of neutralizing the threat of Ukraine in NATO, starting construction of the strategically important 
Nord Stream Russian pipeline to Germany and westwards, and Russia advancing its South Stream gas pipeline plans 
has effectively rendered Washington’s Nabucco pipeline counter-strategy impotent. These developments ensure that 
Russia’s role as Europe’s largest energy supplier is secure. In recent years Russia has grown to become the source for 
almost 30% of EU oil imports and by far the largest share of its natural gas.http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article18073.html - 
_edn20#_edn20 That has enormous strategic geopolitical significance, a point not missed in Washington.  
However, with its role in Europe seemingly shored up and the Orange Revolution de facto rolled back, Russia’s 
policymakers are increasingly turning to the east and the energy demands of its cooperation partner and former Cold 
War foe, China. 
A trans-Caspian gas pipeline project bypassing Russia would not hurt its interests or the interests of the country's 
energy giant Gazprom, a deputy industry and energy minister said on Friday. "That point of view only exists in the 
minds of the media," Ivan Materov said. The $6 billion pipeline project is expected to link energy-rich Central Asia to 
Europe through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. Construction is scheduled to begin in 2009, enabling 
the pipeline to go on stream in 2012. The official also said that Russia does not regard the Nabucco project as a rival or 
alternative to the South Stream project, which is designed to carry gas to southern Europe from Russia. He said gas 
pumped along the Nabucco pipeline would be too expensive and uncompetitive, compared to South Stream.  
The European Union wants the project to diversify its supply routes away from Russia and to boost European energy 
security. Russia's energy giant Gazprom and Italy's Eni signed a deal in late November to set up a joint venture to 
conduct a feasibility study for South Stream at a ceremony in Moscow attended by President Vladimir Putin and Italian 
Prime Minister Romano Prodi. The pipeline is set to cover over 900 km (560 miles) under the Black Sea from Russia to 
Bulgaria and supply 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Possible routes for the land section of the pipeline in 
Europe are still being discussed. The project is set to strengthen Russia's position as Europe's main energy supplier. 
The country already provides 40% of the continent's natural gas needs. Russia has sought to build direct export 
routes to the EU since bitter disputes with the ex-Soviet republics Ukraine and Belarus, which affected supplies to 
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Europe. European nations have expressed concerns over growing energy dependence on Russia and sought to diversify 
supplies to enhance their energy security. The Russian Kommersant daily said on Thursday that Hungary's oil and gas 
company MOL had suggested merging at least eight gas transportation companies in Central Europe into a consortium, 
tentatively called New Europe Transmission System, in a bid to secure more beneficial loans, including for Nabucco 
[21]. 
 
 
Figure. 3. Oil Facts of USA and Latin America. (Source: Rangel B., 2005:482. and USSC 2004:21) 
1.5. USA: Offshore Forcedly Partner 
Kleveman thesis [9], supported by a mix of insinuation and argument, is that everything that happens,  and 
particularly everything bad that happens, in Central Asia is caused by oil. He had argued that a lot of what happens in 
Central Asia is caused by oil his thesis would have been correct but unremarkable. He had tried to explain what exactly 
is caused by oil and what is not, the result would have been subtle and thought-provoking,  but getting there would 
probably have required him to do some serious research.  Instead he wanders from country to country in search of 
people to interview,  and insists on treating everything he’s told as a scoop.  
Kleveman’s methods and conclusions fit together nicely, however, when he finds himself trying to prove that, say 
Chinese policy in Xinjiang or American policy in Afghanistan is a product of oil politics. In Xinjiang, Kleveman 
attempts to tie the Chinese government’s oppression of the native Uyghur population with the region’s importance both 
as a source of oil and as a transit corridor for Kazakh oil [19]. As evidence of this connection, he points out that China 
needs oil and that Xinjiang has (a little) oil. Then, to cinch his case, he gives us David, a Han Chinese Engineer from 
Shanghai who has come to Xinjiang with some friends to see the mountains.  In a paragraph that is fairly representative 
of his method. 
The world is running out of cheap oil. Like the production of most mineral commodities, the production of oil 
follows a bell curve. The top of the bell coincides with the point at which 50% of the known reserves of oil have been 
depleted. The date for such an event to take place has been forecast to be between 2004 and 2010. We thus have 
roughly 15 years to rebuild Western civilization, as soon oil production will meet a negative EROEI (Energy Return on 
Energy Invested). This simply put is the point at which no matter how much oil is underground, its extraction cost 
would make it useless for economic purposes. In the 1950s you needed one barrel of oil to extract 30 barrels. By the 
1990s the ratio had fallen to 5 to 1. Once the ratio hits 1 to1, oil may be technically extractable but it will be of no use as 
an energy source (figure 3). The occurrence of the Oil Peak or Huber’s Peak would call for strong international 
cooperation to rapidly increase output while curbing demand and investing in alternative energy sources. But what if 
someone has an alternative plan? 
In terms of other options being proposed by some in Washington, for Iraqi gas to flow into Nabucco it would have to 
go through the East Anatolian regions of both Iraq and of Turkey, giving the Iraqi Kurdish minorities a potential major 
new revenue source, something not so very welcome in Istanbul. Iran as a potential gas source is at present not in the 
Washington calculus because of the tensions over Iranian nuclear plans, but more because of Iran’s enormous influence 
over the future of Iraq, where they exercise significant influence on the majority Shi’ite population there.  
The Middle East finds a path to stability; the Americas actively engage in development of energy resources,  as the 
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region holds 12% of the world’s energy reserves. The Americas come together under a development-based approach to 
Energy Security which reduces the rate of consumption of oil in the United States while creating up- and down-stream 
job opportunities for the lower income echelons in the countries where significant oil and gas reservoirs are located. 
Pricing policies entice development of alternative sources. Over a period of 20 years, the energy structure of the 
Americas becomes the most diversified in the world. Innovation tied to alternative sources of energy boosts 
development rates in the hemisphere. Democracies become gradually more stable, as the development approach touches 
the daily lives of the many who now have a stake in stability and growth [17]. Ethanol, compressed natural gas, 
hydroelectric power, nuclear and solar energy, reduce oil consumption and the speed of the oil depletion curve. The 
world economy finds some bumpy roads but rebounds strongly thereafter to enter a three-decade long growth path [10]. 
The present geopolitical landscape associated with the notion of resource wars in the Caspian and Central Asian 
regions, as well as in other continents, wars fought for gaining access and control of raw products, will be the distinctive 
feature of worldwide security concerns. Notwithstanding this fact, a sense of unease prevails over which way the US is 
conducting its policies of savage neo-liberalism tied up to the notions and common practices of globalisation 
phenomena [11]. This also renders visible that some sort of Weltanschauung, the only possible world outlook, is set up 
arbitrarily in the name of progress and commodity, but at the expense of the underdeveloped South, which for sure does 
not take advantage or profits from this “brave new world”. 
 
Figure.4. Global Energy circulation and Turkey Location (2010) 
2. Conclusions 
Turkey posses one of the strategic areas of the world in terms of its geographical location. However, geopolitics 
location and geographic location are different from each other that are generally confused. It is important to work for 
country’s relative location’s being strong as a country. 
Turkey should follow each energy investment, production and marketing in the close or far environment. That’s why 
Turkey takes part in the periphery of the energy geography but in the center of flow map (figure 4). Turkey will 
particularly interest in changes or density in the direction of north-south and east-west in energy flow map. Apart from 
these, Turkey should be prepared for some special events. The main ones of these are as in the following: 
Russia is the biggest gas supplier of Europe. It increases this share everyday. Although- together with Turkey it is 
advantageous in terms of geographical distance- Russia’s gas pipeline HAT in the east-west direction may seem as 
disadvantageous for Turkey in short or middle term, in natural gas market every tendency in east-west direction will 
increase the importance of the geographical area in which Turkey is located. What is important for Turkey is that it can 
get more shares from this flow. The amount of gas that Turkey get from Azarbayjan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia and 
the probable pipes it will construct will increase Turkey’s marketing power. Thus, our geopolitics power will increase in 
accordance with bringing more gas and petrol than Ceyhan. 
1. Turkey should not have negative attitudes towards to South Flow Project as it is viewed as a planned response to 
Nabucco project and it should act with a more strategic plan combining South flow- Blue flow-Nabucco. Thus a 
similar route to the route in tanker transportation that Russia presently follows “Novorosisjk-Bosphoruses-Agean-
Mediterrenian  is constituted from the land. At present, Russia’s being producer, transporter and marketing country 
and its effect makes South flow advantageous to Nabucco. The competition between the South flow and Nabucco 
is a project that America attaches great importance so as not to make Russia being a petro and gas monopol. 
However, Turkey’s benefit goes through combining these two projects. Russian gas should be marketed from 
Samsun line over Turkey instead of Novorosijk-Burgaz over Bulgaria. Thus, the distance of pipelines in Black sea 
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decreases and this will also cause a decline in the expense. By this way, Turkey can market gas to south and north 
of Europe. South flow-Nabucco project going through from the Greece should be Turkey’s National 
Strategy. 
2. Although Caspian pipe line among Russia-Kazakistan-Turkmenistan seems to increase gas bargaining among 
Turkey-Turkmenistan-Russia the above project can go forward. But Trans-Caspian pipeline should be realized 
rapidly with the connection of Türkmenbaúı-Kırıkkale. By integrating Kazakhistan’s Aqtau and Tengiz lines to 
energy arz can be made  variety. Constructing this line very rapidly has a grave importance in terms of Turkey’s 
geopolitics. By this way, geopolitics location will be made stronger and advantageous to South flow. 
Transcaspian line should be definitely made operating before Russia’s Caspian line. Nabucco’s construction 
is directly proportional to Transhazar line development. Thus, for Russia and Turkey gas suppliers are the same.  
Those who convince Kazakhistan and Turkmenistan will increase its bargaining share on the table. 
3. The USA’s wish of investing on area’s petrol and natural gas resources as a super power outside that area causes 
many confusions. The USA wants Caspian Sea and Middle East sources’ to be moved in the north-south direction. 
For the USA only acceptable flow map is Caspian Sea-Arabic Sea line or Caspian Sea-Bengal Gulf. For the 
security of this line, the USA still makes some asymmetric fights in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Transferring 
Kazakhistan and Turkmenistan sources to Hint Ocean is a national strategy for the USA. What is important for the 
USA is not using the gas sources itself but not being under the authority of Russia. Thus, the worst scenario  for 
the USA is Hazar pipe line that Russia supports. The countries necessary for the USA’s strategy are Kazakistan, 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. On the back scene of pressures on Iran, the USA’s pipe line idea 
lies. Kazakhistan and Turkmenistan may come across with the choice of the USA or Russia in long term. The 
USA’s providing energy transfer in north-south direction will make Turkey’s geopolitics location weaker and it is 
the worst scenario for Turkey’s economic benefits. For the USA, on the other hand, the projects of Baku-Tıflis-
Ceyhan, Transhazar and Nabucco projects are alternative and supported projects against Russia.  
4. On the condition that South Flow project, Caspian Project and Caspian-Arabic Sea projects are realized, Turkey’s 
historical, cultural, economic and politic effect on the region will be limited and also decrease. Furthermore, it will 
change the increasing customer supply-demand curve in favour of customer and will make an expensive energy 
transfer.  Again, American plan deciding Iraqian petrol to Mediterrenian over Israel is a competitor and alternative 
to Turkey’s plan of making Ceyhan petrol terminal.  
5. The further projects to weaken Turkey’s geopolitics location are Russia’s  North Flow Project as it takes Middle 
Europe into gas transfer area is in conflict with the Nabucco project. Moreover, Kazakhistan-China pipe lines are 
also lines against Russia, USA and even Turkey. 
Besides Turkey-Greece-Italy and Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Transcaspian natural gas pipeline projects, Egypt-
Turkey, Iraq-Turkey and Nabucco pipeline projects will contribute to Turkey's importance and lead Turkey to benefit 
from its geographical location. The other alternatives, namely South Stream project, Trans-Asia projects, Iraq-Israel and 
Middle Asia-Pakistan projects are seen as projects that will diminish the importance of Turkey. The words of Pierre 
Noel, Professor of Cambridge University and EU Foreign Affairs researcher, show the importance of petropolitics on 
change: "There is an open, competitive and capitalist economy in which firms are free to construct pipelines as they 
want". 
In case if the southern and northern Russia is decided as the path for the pipelines, the idea that Turkey will be more 
important actor in the geopolitical balance will be weakened. When we add the possibility of the transfer of African gas 
through the Mediterrenaian Sea and of Middle Eastern and Middle Asian petroleum and gas through countries other 
than Turkey, Turkey's geopolitical and geostrategic importance will decrease.  In fact while assessing Turkey's 
diplomatic and geopolitical interests, one should consider the importance of the Afro-Eurasia centered energy transfer 
and the fact that the results cannot be taken only through diplomatic means. It is important to read the map through 
considering culture and politics rather than sole diplomatic lenses. Besides, while defining the energy politics of the 
country, it is important to consider the fact that petroleum and gas can be consumed in the long run. It should be 
understood that Turkey's future depends not on pratic and popular geopolitics but on structural geopolitical processes. 
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